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Anthony Kubiak 
1. Prelude and katastrophe 
In 1984, news anchorman Ted Koppel, who, with Ronald Reagan rose to 
national fame during the terrorism of the Iran hostage incident, expressed a 
now-familiar (and largely unexplored) sentiment in a Harper's magazine 
interview. "The media," he said, "particularly television, and terrorists need one 
another, they have what is fundamentally a symbiotic relationship" ("Terrorism" 
47). Now this is a very curious thing: in symbiosis, each element functions as 
a necessary other; thus terrorists would not only create an economy of the 
media event, but the media event would create terrorists. And not merely in 
the sense of providing would-be revolutionaries with a medium within which 
to function: the news media, by providing us with what is new and seemingly 
originary, inscribes and informs terrorism. Terrorism appears first in culture 
as a media event. The terrorist, consequently, does not exist before the media 
image, and only exists subsequently as a media image in culture. 
This bio-economic association is developed along a slightly different axis 
later in the same article when journalist Charles Krauthammer calls terrorism 
since 1968 (apropos 1968), "media terrorism," an essentially new, international 
form of violence that "needs" and manipulates media as the raison d'etre for its 
existence: "Since the outlaws cannot buy television time, they have to earn it 
through terrorist acts. Like the sponsors of early television who produced 
shows as vehicles for their commercials, media terrorists [sic] now provide 
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drama-murder and kidnapping, live-in return for advertising time" 
(Terrorism" 50). 
What was the title of this special, provocative issue of Harper'si "Lost in 
the Terrorist Theatre." The issue in fact begins with a whole series of direct 
associations between terrorism and performance: terrorism's "bloody theatrics" 
follow closely "the script" of "the terrorist productions." Sprinkled throughout 
the interviews and essays are numerous quotes from various sources explicating 
terrorism's theatrical theory and production practice. Taken together, the 
assumption seems to be that the theatricalization of political violence did not 
really occur until the great age of video began during the height of the 
Vietnam action, but nowhere do we see the explication of the other aspect of 
the symbiosis, the aspect that sees the appearance of terrorism as a natural 
extension of performative terror, a terror that precedes the mediadrome and 
gives it birth. 
I would then suggest an inversion: that the symbiosis between terrorism 
and media is an authentic one, but that the emphasis ought to be reversed-
the media do not merely "need" and support terrorism, they construct it as a 
phenomenon, because American culture as a whole needs it, is fascinated by 
it, desires it, and utilizes it as a central impulse in its foreign and domestic 
policy. I would further suggest that while terrorism is not theatre, terrorism's 
affiliation with political coercion as performance is a history whose first 
impulse is a terror that is theatre's moment, a terror that is so basic to human 
life that it remains largely invisible except as theatre. Theatre's filiation with 
psychic and political terror is a history which is the perfect twin of terror's own 
history as politics. That history—the operation and objectification of terror as 
a first principle of performance, from thought, to mise en scene, to terrorist 
act-is the subject of this paper—a paper which attempts ultimately to provide 
the basis for a different kind of theatre history. 
This performative history of terror was, as I have just suggested, first 
rehearsed as thought, as myth. Hesiod, writing on the far side of the great 
classical age of theatre, describes the irruption of this terror in a curious union: 
the marriage of Kytheria and Ares, eros and war. This conjunction bears a 
malignant fruit, the twins Panic1 [Phobos] and Terror [Deimos], superstars of 
the theatre of war, the remembrance of myth, and the enactment of dream; a 
conjugation raging with the ecstasies of sex and violence erupting from within 
the riddle of performance, a conjugation embodying the relation between 
terror, terrorism, and its showings. 
Two hundred years later, these sibling Terrors dream another kind of 
showing, a livid theatre, the goatsung tragedy, and the classical stage articulates 
itself specifically ay theatre within the omnipresence of catastrophe, catastrophe 
which is, however, repressed in an injunction to silence and secreted acts of 
violence (even as Euripides' Medea nominally submits to silence, the hidden 
and violent crime which holds her mind threatens to rupture the tragic 
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circumscription of the law, but draws back in the face of what is literally 
unspeakable and so unthinkable). 
In Seneca's Medea, appearing some five hundred years later, the breach 
again threatens amidst the interpénétration of theatre and terror crystallizing 
in the Imperial Roman spectacles of the Great Circus, which displaced the 
theatre of the Republic and demanded a state terrorism grounded in real 
death, blood, and pain extracted from the bodies of its slave-performers. 
Seneca prophesies through his Medea a political counter-terror erupting 
through the theatricalized violence in the political spectacle of law: "Whatever 
stood within this royal house has fallen . . . Is there no limit to catastrophe?" 
(879-86) The warning might have been directed to theatre itself, silenced as 
it was in the ethical preoccupations of an emerging Christianity, and the 
suspicions of an encroaching barbarism. 
On the other side of the great Medieval theatrical silence, the tradition 
of terror re-emerges (or so we have been told) with the appearance of the 
Quern Quaeritis trope in the tenth century: "Whom do you seek," asks the 
angel at the tomb. "Jesus of Nazareth," the women reply, "who was crucified." 
Theatrical scholarship in the west thus locates its origins in the reappearance 
of a disappeared victim of State terror, an identification which defines hope as 
the repressed terror of torture and death repositioned in the Church's 
censorship of the drama. 
The laminations and permutations of mythic and theatrical terror continue 
in the Renaissance tragedies. In the works of Kyd, Shakespeare, Marlowe, and 
Webster, terror's image now takes center stage in plays such as Edward II or 
The Revenger's Tragedy. Ultimately, in the productions of the Jacobean period, 
terror seems literally to spill over into the pit, bleeding, finally, into yet another 
abysmal fissure, the repression of the Interregnum. 
On the Restoration stage, terror's deployments indeed reappear, and are 
now carefully regulated and applied with surgical precision in the maintenance 
of social appearances in the cruel and witty "comedies" of Congreve, Etherege, 
Wycherley and others, molding in a way that Puritanism could not the later 
attitudes and beliefs of middle class culture. 
Into the nineteenth century, theatrical terror seemingly exhausts the 
physical, and is redirected "inward" where it redefines and gives literary 
substance to the forces of the psyche in the terror-stricken dramatic works of 
the Romantic poets. Plays such as Byron's Manfred, Shelley's The Cenci and 
Prometheus Unbound, and Coleridge's Remorse, eventually inform the space of 
a modern psyche, and give place to a psychology whose darker side ultimately 
emerges in the practice of social engineering as psychosurgery, electroconvul-
sive therapy, and mental incarceration, "another reign of terror" (Foucault, 
Madness 202). 
Inexorably, in the Modern period, the inheritance of the Enlightenment 
seems to collapse under the impact of techno-industrialization, world wars, and 
Holocausts. From Ibsen on, humanism begins to dissolve into the very 
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information systems that gave it birth, and the shards and fragments reappear 
in the drama in the images of yet another, solipsistic terror which is ironically 
terrified of its own disappearance: Beckett's bums, aliens in a blasted 
landscape, cannot seem to leave terror's site. 
In theatre's recent history-as Genet marks out the terrorizing topography 
and psychosexual gainings of love's suspicious history, and Beckett exposes the 
self-destructive violence of culture and consciousness in performances which 
often rely on the actual implementation of the bondage, physical pain, and 
psychic torture which he nominally abhors-the problematic is compounded by 
the appearance of real violence in the body art of Bruce Naumann, Vito 
Acconci, Chris Burden, Gina Pain, and others. Meanwhile, in the womb of the 
mediadrome, the Red Brigades kidnap and execute Aldo Moro in a terrorist 
"morality play" while Baader-Meinhof is silenced, both literally and theatrically, 
"off-stage" in the dark and hidden cells of Stammheim prison. 
More recently, as bombs explode in Frankfurt airport and terrorists hijack 
luxury cruise ships and throw the handicapped into the Adriatic, the "terrorist" 
Start community in Philadelphia is literally snuffed out in a self-fulfiUing, 
prophetic scenario of gratuitous, mediated "anti-terrorist" violence almost 
unsurpassed in the carefully scripted performance documentations of broadcast 
news. 
Eventually, as "real" terrorism develops its own audiences and theatrical-
izes its presentations, and the "real" theatre begins staging plays about 
terrorism in an attempt to "understand" the phenomenon which has seemingly 
appropriated its name and its form, form and concept begin to blur. Terrorism 
is now called "theatre" while we try to convince ourselves that what happens 
onstage can have anything to do with the real terrorisms of ruptured bodies 
and wounded minds. Finally, as the actual practice of terrorism is dissolved 
into the numbing repetitions of terror's mediated images, violence and terror 
seem to be everywhere, and theatre and terrorism become, ironically, emptied 
of terror. Both theatre and terrorism become evenly distributed in the 
agonizing search for substance beneath the "mere appearance" of culture and 
its hidden violence. Meanwhile, real terrorisms remain, seemingly auto-
nomous, working their way outside in: from the threat of global holocaust or 
"natural" disaster, to the viral infections of failed immune response, the terror 
is still with us, shadowing our thought. 
But this appearance of terror in theatre's history is not a new observation, 
nor is there anything particularly novel in the recognition that theatre has 
always been the vehicle for social ideology and control, but neither is it the 
point of this essay: for I am proposing that theatre is not merely a means by 
which social behavior is engineered; it is the site of violence, the locus of 
terror's emergence as myth, law, religion, economy, gender, class, race, either 
in the theatre, or in culture as a theatricality which precedes culture. Theatre 
is, then, the proleptic site of terror's transformation into culture and its 
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terrorisms, staging the very birth of that which seemingly gives it birth—a birth 
of tragedy. 
2. Terror and kathwsis 
With the publication of The Origins of German Tragic Drama in 1928, 
Walter Benjamin reframed what is perhaps the most critical perception in 
Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy—that the Greek tragic theatre, and perhaps 
theatre generically, is the product of the psycho-cultural passage from 
myth/religion into law, and that the appearance of theatre in the West 
represents the forensic, representational space of this passage. What Nietzsche 
describes problematically as the "mere appearance of mere appearance" in the 
theatre articulates the entrance of an earlier, "sacred" terror on a new stage 
- a theatre of jurisdiction: "The bright projections of the Sophoclean hero-
in short, the Apollonian aspect of the mask—are necessary effects of a glance 
into the inside and terrors of nature; as it were, luminous spots to cure eyes 
damaged by gruesome night" (Birth 45, 66). The induction of this "gruesome 
night" into the theatre, where it might be tragically "cured," was and is 
asymptotic with the emergence of a "luminescent," recuperative law. 
But the simultaneous emergence of tragedy and law also suggests a more 
fundamental relationship than a mere tactical support by theatre in the 
establishment of legal codes. It represents a necessary conjunction of law and 
theatre in history. Although this relationship is often described in terms of the 
formation of a culture/law that allows theatre to appear-that theatre in some 
sense always "looks back" to its origins in the law-what is usually forgotten is 
the sense in which theatre enunciates the very instant of perception that exists 
before culture and its laws can appear. This instant, as Nietzsche tells us, is 
deeply ambivalent: in the expanding field of thought and perception that is 
culture, thought itself holds the violence of chaos at bay. Yet this instant is 
also the moment of another terror—the moment of the many against the one, 
but also, and perhaps more profoundly, the instant of alienation, fragmentation, 
and death which is the dark and violent aspect of perception itself—the terror 
that what is perceived is always Other, always suspect, always a lie: "Men 
should be what they seem," says Iago, even as he teaches us that perception 
itself is "always already" infected by desire, a desire which Freud tells us, is, at 
mind's end, the desire for the "true illusion" of death. 
Perception is absolutely infused by terror-a confrontation with the 
imminence of a non-being which defines life—with pain and death and madness 
"feelingly perceived" in the terrorizing play of human thought itself, the play 
that is theatre, the "initiatory breach which remembers the primal violence" in 
the meeting between "life and death, art and life, the thing itself and its double" 
(Blau, "Universals" 150). 
In the institutional theatre, within the reverberations of theatre's seminal 
relation to the Law in tragedy, the terror of non-being is ultimately crystallized 
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as the threat of terrorism—an objectification of terror in the ideology of the 
violent image.2 This objectification of terror is subsequently used as a 
disciplining force applied to the body and mind, and takes different forms in 
different theatrical periods. The forms of terror and its -isms are, then, 
historically unique to each age of the theatre. The history of performance 
becomes, in this sense, a history of the ways in which terror is objectified as 
ideology/law and deployed as a means of sociopolitical conditioning which can 
be traced along several axes: the creation and use of gender, race, or class as 
means of terrorizing control, for example, or in the ideological coercion 
couched in the representational systems (Cartesianism, Hegelianism, etc.) that 
theatre generates in any given age.3 These ideological coercions, moreover, 
suggest real practices on real bodies in the political order, a political order that 
in turn deploys its own terrorisms theatrically. 
In either case, the theatre that is consciousness—the source of performa-
tive questions of subject/object, watcher and watched, actor and spectator, 
reality and "mere appearance"—materializes before the institutional/political 
theatre both synchronically and diachronically; not only does the mise en scene 
of thought and perception precede the theatrical production in all cases, but, 
as I've already suggested, the terror of theatre's thought precedes classical 
performance by some two hundred years in the writings of Hesiod. 
Hesiod's vision—unlike the theories which seek the origins of Greek 
theatre (and theatre in general) in Dionysian festivals or other "carnivalized" 
or para-theatrical rituals of culture, in those cultural and religious per-
formances which in some sense celebrate the cohesion of a society already 
born into the law-elucidates through its anti-mythic mythos a theory of terror's 
theatre which is grounded in the chiaroscuro of perception itself. The Hesiodic 
description of terror's appearance illuminates the later development of theatre 
and performance in ways which have been largely ignored by other historic or 
anthropological approaches to theatre's history. 
Hesiod, we are told, is "the first Greek who names himself," a mytho-
grapher who looks both with bitter skepticism and nostalgia on the dogma he 
records. His mythic narratives, "vast and heavy, dark and shadow veiled," mark 
the "cross over into history and reality" from the radiant and brutal world of 
Homeric retribution.4 Indeed, the genesis of the sibling Terrors in Hesiod's 
work reveals the concerns of a proletarian and tragic man who nursed an 
intense distrust of judicious appearances, a hatred of violence, and a deep 
dread of social harmony's secret affiliation with terror and war (Burke, 
Attitudes 80-83). Phobos first appears in Hesiod's Theogony in this familial 
context: 
Now Kytheria 
to Ares, stabber of shields bore Panic [Phobos] 
and Terror [Deimos], dreaded 
gods, who batter the dense battalions 
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of men embattled 
in horrible war, they with Ares, 
sacker of cities. She also 
bore him Harmonia (934-938). 
The Hesiodic Phobos appears again, figuratively and literally, in The Shield of 
Herakles, adorning that hero's circular shield: 
And there were folds 
of cobalt driven upon it 
In the middle was a 
face of Panic, 
not to be spoken of, 
glaring on the beholder 
with eyes full of fire glinting 
and the mouth of it was full of teeth, 
terrible, repugnant 
and glittering white (142-149). 
This passage describes the Heraklean Shield in images of grotesque and 
nightmarish violence, images that evoke the blood maddened mind of Herakles 
himself. The face of Phobos occupies the central space of the shield, at the 
graven nightmare's navel where the articulation of meanings is lost in terror's 
repugnant and speechless mouth. The figured silence of the screaming image 
echoes back to the concealed and Unnamed Deimos, that other terror "not to 
be spoken of." 
In the figuration on the "gold-glowing," mirror-like shield, Phobos appears 
as the manifestation or reflection of his brother, as the mask of Deimos that, 
like a mask, proclaims in its form and conceals in its function the split between 
reality and appearance, inside and outside, disappearance and return, 
repression and exclusion, thought5 and representation. Deimos disappears 
behind the image of Phobos, while Phobos generates the "seeming substance" 
of terror in mere appearance.6 At the same time, the dream-like circumscrip-
tions on the Heraklean shield represent the inevitable displacement7 of 
dream/performance by artifact or document, a displacement indicated by the 
appearance of a dream text on the inscribed shield-the usurpation of 
dreamed-desire, of thought, by representation and production, but a produc-
tion which is, in this case, still closely linked to its ontologie bloodlines, to 
"Terror, dream-diviner of this house."8 
In Hesiod the terrible brothers appear in a theatre of war, indicating their 
filiation with the violence of the father, Ares. Although Hesiod does not 
specifically mention any interaction between Phobos and Deimos and their 
mother Aphrodite (Kytheria), terror appears as the child of Desire and 
Violence frequently enough in the later history of drama, often as an indication 
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of an epiphanic chaos that subverts the seeming harmony of law and order. 
"If I be Venus, thou must needs be Mars" says Bel-Imperia while seducing her 
lover Horatio, in Kyd's The Spanish Tragedy, "And where Mars reigneth, there 
must needs be wars" (2.2.34-35). A few lines later, immediately after sexual 
consummation, Horatio is horribly and gratuitously murdered in an act of 
passion and political intrigue that sets into motion a series of assassinations 
and retaliations that strike at the foundation of the political order, revealing 
avant la lettre the phobias of a somewhat later Jacobean age-terrors that are 
conceived and violently exteriorized through Horatio/Mars' seduction by Bel-
Imperia/Venus. 
In Hesiod, as in Kyd, Phobos masks a showing. In Lacanian terms, he 
represents within the text the abolished presence (forclusion: the denial of 
experience's access into the Symbolic, experience's a priori expulsion back into 
the Real) of Deimos projected outward into the scene of violence~a theatre 
of pure cruelty. This is a manifestation of a terror that is both specular and 
performative. The apparitions and concealments that describe the relationship 
between Phobos and Deimos mark both the dislocations and disappearances 
that are central to theatre and performance-the essential unlocatability of the 
vanishing Deimos, for example, or the secretions of meaning in the appearance 
of Phobos, who plays out war and performs acts of violence that are later 
inscribed on the "magic writing pad" of the Heraklean shield, much as a 
modern performance artist might document his work.9 
Phobos reveals himself in these performative spaces~the theatres of war, 
the circular shield of remembrance, the mise en scene of thought/desire and 
representation. He paradoxically embodies in carefully inscribed images of 
disarray, chaos, and dislocation the violent resistances that define the 
difference between thought and its representations: Phobos, as the image of 
Deimos, locates displacement and repression in his very appearance. Deimos, 
on the other hand, describes a critical absence or lack, a "hole" in the fabric of 
consciousness that indicates a pathology of deficiency: 
a béance of some sort, resulting from the way in which the original 
tissue [of consciousness] itself was woven; forclusion would be sort 
of an "original hole," never capable of finding its own substance 
again since it had never been anything other than "hole-substance."10 
This pathology is also congenital to theatre, a pathology in which we can trace 
either the repression or the forclusion of terror by theatrical representation. 
And this distinction is critical, for when political terror is repressed through 
theatre-or more precisely, when the relation between terror and its implemen-
tation in the images of terrorism is repressed-when it is dislocated into the 
image systems of spectacle, it displaces cultural terror and terror's pain into 
the strategies of information until terror and its -isms become formalized, 
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objectified and gradually neutralized into concealed ideologies or mere habits 
of thought. 
When terror is displaced by forclusion in the theatre, however, and then 
re-presented, it appears not as representation (because it cannot be repre-
sented), but as hallucination, as some Unnameable Thing that Returns in the 
Real like a Jacobean apparition.11 This forclusion seems more potentially 
subversive in its relation to actual terror because it does not seek to conceal 
terror per se (although it must to some degree), but seeks to reject the 
repressive signifying order itself—the order of law-in its entirety. Artaud 
perceived this when he wrote: 
The theatre will never find itself again-i.e. constitute a means of 
true illusion—except by furnishing the spectator with the truthful 
precipitate of dreams, in which his taste for crime, his erotic 
obsessions, his savagery, his chimeras, his Utopian sense of life and 
matter, even his cannibalism, pour out, on a level not counterfeit 
and illusory, but internal. (Artaud, Theatre 92) 
"True illusion"-the hallucinatory return, in other words, of what has been 
excluded in the Real—rediscovers its connection to terror in the immediacy of 
thought, in the perception of the terror that is thought. 
We can see this distinction between repression and forclusion by 
comparing, for example, the Euripidean Medea's response to terror—in which 
the relation between terror and its implementation in terrorism is repressed 
in the Law of language, in the very inscription of the word "silence" itself~to 
the final act of Marlowe's Edward II, in which the assassin Lightborne comes 
to the jailers who are holding Edward in the cloacal dungeon "To which the 
channels of the castle run." Lightborne carries a letter: 
Enter Lightborne 
Light: My Lord Protector greets you [Gives letter.] 
Gur: What's here? I know not how to conster it. 
Mat: Gurney, it was left unpointed for the nonce; 
'Edwardum occidere nolite timere,' 
That's his meaning. 
Light: Know you this token? I must have the 
king. (5.5.5-11) 
'Edwardum occidere nolite timere bonum est' is from Holinshed's Chronicles 
of England in which the story of Edward's grisly death is recounted: 
Withal the Bishop of Hereford under a sophistical forme of words 
signified to them by his letters, that they should dispatch him out of 
the way, as thus: Edwardum occidere nolite timere bonum est: To 
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kill Edward will not to fear it is good. Whiche riddle or doubtful 
kind of speech . . . might be taken in two contraire senses, onley by 
placing the poynt called comma, they interpreted it in the worse 
sense.12 
The two senses of the phrase, "Fear not to kill the king. . . . Kill not the king, 
'tis good to fear the worst.'" (5.4.9-12), depend upon the placement of a 
comma, but the text within Marlowe's text is left unpunctuated. Edward's fate 
is determined by the "missing poynte" that leads to his disappearance.13 The 
unpunctuated text, or rather the point that is missing in the text, marks a hole 
or rend in the textual tissue, corresponding to a béance in the tissue of 
consciousness. Furthermore, the forclusion comes again in a horrifying form; 
the missing comma returns in the Real as the hollow horn pushed into 
Edward's anus to guide the red-hot poker that kills him: "They kept him 
down, and withall put into his fundament an home" (Charleton 194). The 
guiding horn "appears as a punctuation without a text," and thus the "castrated" 
or disembodied phallus/comma comes from without as a real object of 
violence in the hand of the Luciferian Lightborne, who embodies the disap-
peared lover Gaveston: 
K. Edw: Who's there? What light is that? 
Wherefore comes thou? 
Light: To comfort you, and bring you joyous 
news. (5.5.44-45) 
In the performative site of Edward II, Lightborne/Phobos functions as gestus, 
glyph or cipher, Gaveston/Deimos as the exclusion of that inscription. The 
affiliation or interval between them is a space of theatrical possibility in which 
relations of power become thought at thought's extremity. Thus while it is 
obvious that Marlowe's play-or any play, for that matter-must always re-
press terror as performance or text, this repression operates within Marlowe's 
play as an exclusion, as a rejection of the signifying order which reverberates 
beyond the play and calls into question the very hierarchies of power which 
depend upon that signifying order for entrenchment and stability. 
These last comments on Edward II will suggest several questions: al-
though all performance is to some extent repressive, to what degree does any 
given performance reveal its repressive mechanisms? To what degree does a 
performance, in its rejection of the signifying order through forclusion, show 
its own relation to violence and terror? To what degree does any perfor-
mance represent the hallucinatory expulsions from the "political uncon-
scious"? Although there can certainly be no play that is purely a repression 
or a forclusion, certainly, determining the degree to which a given per-
formance is operating in one or the other mode can reveal the critical move-
ments of terror and terrorism in history. 
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The Phobos/Deimos relation represents, in this context, several dif-
ferent types and levels of meaning in performance: the relation between 
neurosis and schizophrenia; the breach between thought and its "theft" by 
language; the difference between theatre and its double; the reference be-
tween the Symbolic/Imaginary (representation-Phobos) and the Real (what 
cannot be represented—Deimos); the collusion between terror (which cannot 
enter systems of information or representation), and the terrorism that ends 
in the ceaseless cycles of mediations as the information system of the absent 
terror. In each case Phobos (the unpunctuated text) displaces Deimos (punc-
tuation without a text), and Deimos is either repressed or cast into the Real 
through the discharges of performance. 
By the same token, these performative ideas in Hesiod, while quite 
evocative and perhaps in some ways perfunctorily theatrical, must at the 
same time be differentiated from performance itself. When we speak of 
theatre or performance, we are speaking of a place where what is is what is 
shown "out there" in real bodies living and dying in real time. What we in 
fact see in the tragic theatre (differentiated from "tragedy" as a literary type 
or genre) is the appearance of what had remained unarticulated. This show-
ing is in fact the primary business of the theatre; language, words, letters, 
signs must be embodied, voiced, shown, made present. What we see in 
Hesiod is theatre as forclusion, performativity as disavowal exemplified in the 
terror that is, in a single line, both revealed and repudiated, "In the middle 
was a / face of Panic, / not to be spoken of." 
Here we are faced with a paradox, however, because in performance 
what cannot be articulated must be shown, and when it is shown, it ceases to 
be what it was. Thus when terror enters the information systems of per-
formance, it ceases, in a sense, to be terror-which is unspeakable, and un-
representable—and becomes a mask of itself. Terror is then transformed into 
the imaging system of terrorism. 
There is a chasm, then, between the ontologie theatre, the theatre that 
is thought, and the "ontic" theatre, the theatre that represents the theatre that 
is thought.14 This is further complicated by the difference Fve already sug-
gested between theatres that repress terror by displacing it into the reforming 
sign system of terrorism, and theatres that direct thought back to the un-
representability of terror-the difference between theatre, once again, and its 
double. The issue, finally, is not merely to determine a given theatrical per-
formance's relation to signification, but to determine the ways in which that 
relation mystifies the linkages between signification, theatre, and political vio-
lence. These linkages are the traces, as it were, of the mind's terror upon 
itself. 
The breach between the genotypes of terror (Phobos and Deimos) is 
born of the cleft in solipsistic consciousness that constitutes primary identity 
—what Jacques Lacan calls the mirror stage, in which the child perceives the 
(w)holeness of body/self only in the image of an other. This perception is at 
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once a perception of integration and a recognition that integration (identity) 
can only be had in an other. 
The mirror stage is thus the simultaneous apprehension of an essential 
wholeness and self-alienation in which the self can only be composed and 
apprehended apart from and outside of the self. The other in this case be-
comes a specular principle of discord/harmony through which the individual 
is realized. This is what Anthony Wilden identifies as the "Imaginary Other" 
a kind of proto-Symbolic Other who represents the locus of a law which is 
necessarily violent because it is based not on difference and correspondence 
(communication), but on opposition and identity (conflict). 
This rhetorical silence-what comes to be called in the postmodern 
period "theoretical terrorism"—is represented in the theatre by the relation 
between those figures who function as an absence, as an empty screen for the 
terror-stricken projections of terrorists, and the terrorists who carry out the 
bloody deeds: I've already mentioned the relationship between these two 
figurations in the characters Gaveston and Lightborne, but we also see it in 
the recessive, seated figure in Beckett's Catastrophe who is manipulated by 
the ideologue director, for example, or in the projection of terror onto the 
image of the female/other in the drama~the other who serves as the empty 
space through which desire and its terror(isms) formulates itself. I am think-
ing here of Desdemona and Othello, or the Duchess of Malfi and her 
brother, or any number of plays in which characters formulate their own 
terror against an other-as-absence. 
This relationship between a terror that is (or seems) a withholding, or 
recessiveness, and a terrorism which is an acting out,15 is yet one more rela-
tion between the Deimic and the Phobic, a relation which, in these kinds of 
plays, enters the theatre as a self-reflexive discourse in which the Imaginary 
relation between Phobos and the (now shown) unrepresentable Deimos, is 
represented in an Imaginary other. 
The appearance of the Imaginary Other is, according to Lacan, a neces-
sary stage in the realization of the Symbolic Other, a realization crucial to 
the final development of the individual in society. Thus while the Symbolic 
Other comes, finally, to represent the locus of language and Law, this law is 
not necessarily exploitative or violent, according to Wilden.16 
Theatre, however, is not really of the Symbolic order. It is specular and 
as such is the site of the seduction and "capture" by the Imaginary Other. In 
its guise as a political-cultural institution theatre is the specularity/spectacle 
of the Imaginary and violent law that is "always already" part of the Symbolic 
order. This is different from the drama, from the theatre that exists as 
text/criticism and not as spectacle. The drama exists more specifically as a 
part of the Symbolic order per se~Ùiz order of difference and correspon-
dence-and not, as does performance, in the Imaginary order of opposition 
and identity. 
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This affinity between theatre and the Imaginary order explains, in part, 
the reason that forclusion becomes the means by which the connection be-
tween violence and law is most clearly revealed in performance. Even 
though it is obvious that theatre must exist to some degree within the 
Symbolic, the seeming immediacy of theatrical perception wants in every 
instance, to exclude or repress the symbolic in favor of the Imaginary. 
Consequently the only means by which the repression of the Imaginary is 
revealed is through the complete rejection of the Symbolic and Imaginary 
orders through forclusion, through the recuperation of symbol and 
imagination as hallucination. 
In any case, whether we identify the theatre's Other as Imaginary or 
Symbolic, the alienation of the self in the locus of the Other eventually 
causes what Lacan calls aphanisis, or disappearance, as "I" am displaced 
outside the locus of "my" self, and seem to vanish into the Other. This is the 
essential performative circumstance of theatre and generated, for instance, 
the particular agony of Artaud, that patron saint of the modern theatre, who 
felt himself continuously bereft of a language adequate to his agony.17 
Artaud's tormented disavowal of aphanisis eventually led to his descent into a 
hell of pain, terror, madness, and finally death. There are few better ex-
amples than Artaud's madness of aphanisis in extremis. This is the terroriz-
ing and lethal aspect of the Other as it becomes what Herbert Blau calls the 
Enemy, "all that survives of the Beloved, what makes your hair stand on end" 
{Bodies 133). The threat of disappearance in/by the presence of the Other 
generates this kind of terror out of the differentiating space, the rupture in 
consciousness that displaces the self into the power of an other. 
Moreover, the simultaneous perception and denial that this wound exists 
initiates the obsessive and blinded insight that develops into one of the major 
theoretical principles of tragedy in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex and beyond, lead-
ing us by increments to the seemingly endless, self-silencing ratiocinations of 
Kyd's proto-Hamletic Hieronimo, and finally into the exhaustion of thought 
in Beckett, ending with the flat recitatives and silences of postmodern per-
formance. 
As I suggested at the outset, this burgeoning intuition in Greek culture 
of the essentially infracted nature of consciousness, the "gruesome night" 
emblematic in Oedipus Rex, to name but the most obvious example, emerges 
concurrently with the growth of a complex and exteriorized legal and 
economic system.18 This helps to explain why Greek tragedy's preoccupation 
with crime seems, paradoxically, to anticipate legal systems after the 
historical fact. Crime in tragedy appears both as an individual lack, and as a 
fault line or stress fracture19 in the social structure in which the individual 
(the hero) lives. Crime is ultimately the origin both of the hero, and of 
civilization and culture. In the Oresteia, for example, the concealed Orestes 
(who describes himself in Richmond Lattimore's translation as a "Daulian 
stranger out of Phocis") is eventually resolved and defined through the 
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remembrance of a murder generating murder, recounted mythically and 
mimetically over and again back through time, ending (beginning?) with the 
tribunal of Athena that judges and abolishes the threat of an infinite, 
recursive vengeance, and establishes order and identity as the result of the 
remembered crime. 
Nietzsche sees a similar situation in Oedipus Rex when he identifies the 
Oedipal myth not as the cause and explanation of individual and collective 
neuroses, but rather as the result of some more primal, unspeakable crime 
which is eventually adjudicated through the displacement of the "divine" king 
by the lav/, and then the collective will of the demos {Birth 68). This recalls 
the displacement that occurs in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis, when the specular 
power of the king, the "Imaginary Father," is (at least partially) deposed by 
the subject through the symbolic exchanges (laws) of language and analysis 
(Wilden, Lacan 98). The crime which resolves the individual and creates 
society is brought to justice (language) in an act of (Symbolic) exchange in 
which the primal infraction~the desire for incest or the incest that is desire 
-is adjudged and punished by the very system of signs it generates: the 
heroic silence of the Classical stage is, in other words, the appearance of the 
Lacanian unconscious, the space of articulation in the Other. 
Thus the institution of law, grounded in the expiatory concept of lex 
talionis ("an eye for and eye"-the economization of violence in systems of 
exchange) defines culture and the individual, as Hegel suggests, in negative 
terms through the breaks, dislocations, disappearances and forclusions that 
appear in the individual and collective psyche. The individual and culture 
come to being, in other words, through infractions, real or imagined, judged 
and disposed in the locus of the Other. The recurrence of absence, 
forclusion, aphanisis-the returning, painful expulsions which mark the 
irruption of culture and identity—is the substance of theatre's crime, and is 
theatre history. 
René Girard discusses this performance of expulsion at the cultural-
political level in terms of mimesis. In Violence and the Sacred™ for instance, 
he delineates the ways in which desire is produced through competition with 
an other for the possession of some object that comes, in the desiring 
struggle, to emblematize desire itself.21 Here Girard seems to be describing 
something like an Imaginary Other, an imago that haunts the Symbolic order 
and reduces difference and correspondence to opposition and identity. This 
reduction is the essential operation of repression that I described earlier, and 
is the seeming image of power and force that Girard sees as the generator of 
culture, the seeming image that I would call theatre. 
As the other becomes Double becomes Other becomes Enemy through 
the struggle of opposition and identity in Girard's thought, he is spectacularly 
and ritualistically expelled, either through exile or sacrificial execution in the 
guise of the Double. This expulsion of the Other is not, however, an 
expulsion of the law, per se, but an expulsion of the relation between law and 
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violence which is repressed in the image of the Double. As this relation 
seemingly disappears beyond the frontiers of culture and thought, the 
community experiences its apparent cohesion through the exercise of its 
unanimous violence. This, according to Girard, is the meaning of tragic 
theatre in general, and the meaning of Oedipus Rex in particular. 
What is crucial in this process of identification and expulsion is that the 
link between the unanimous law and violence remain hidden. It is of utmost 
importance that the connection between mimetic desire, or desire in general, 
and the reality of cultural violence remain concealed (unconscious) as well. 
Mimetic desire finds its means of concealment in various kinds of mimetic 
institutions or systems of representation. The systems of signs that are 
chosen are therefore historically selected to conceal the relation between law 
and desiring-violence, between tragedy and its generative terror. Thus tragic 
mimesis, or the particular form and language that tragedy takes on in order 
to imitate and so possess desire, conceals within its lineaments the particular 
mode of repression that identifies the connections between the tragic form 
and the cultural powers it upholds. We seek, then, a kind of Brechtian 
antitoxin, the traces of a para-tragic theatre within the tragic tradition that 
disarticulates its mimetic mechanisms beneath its own terrorized gaze, that 
discovers the Imaginary Other and sees in that delusion, and in the 
hallucinations of terror's violent forclusion, something like Artaud's "truthful 
precipitate of dreams" in the dream of the political unconscious. 
Aristotle, writing this dream on the far side of the passage from mythic 
society to law, named the various mechanisms of violent forclusion and 
dislocation-the "laws of expiation" grown from the substrate of purification 
rite and religious dictum-katharsis .^ The dislocative phenomenon of 
katharsis was, according to Aristotle, effected mimetically through the now 
famous invocation of pity and terror.23 
But although no other theory of performance has had the impact or 
generated the volume of discussion that Aristotle's theory has, the disturbing 
and problematical nature of the meaning of katharsis which resides at the 
heart of Aristotle's theory remains. What seems at first to be a rather simple 
homology of effects in the Aristotelian formula-manic music expelling 
mama, mimetic terror expelling actual terror-becomes more problematic as 
we search for a clearer understanding of the term as it is employed. The 
precise meaning of katharsis becomes fraught with questions and difficulties: 
what, precisely, is being expelledl some morbid terror lying hidden in the 
mind of the subject? and who or what is that—the audience, the actor, the 
"character"? and of what is this terror terrified? what object? what situation? 
Although I can make no pretence to classical scholarship, and so cannot 
support or refute the specifics of the various philological analyses of the 
terms, I would suggest that the "problem" of the meaning of katharsis 
delineates a condition of dislocation that is the precise reflex of katharsis 
(mdphobos, its attendant term) itself.24 
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The fundamental sense of the word katharsis, seems to be grounded in 
the history of medicine, or even earlier, in rites of purification and proto-
legal expiation where the word indicated not a condition or state of mind, but 
a kind of expurgation, a casting away or removal of some impurity, sickness, 
or crime through "ceremonies that wash clean and cast out the Furies" 
(Aeschylus, Libation 968). Katharsis indicated not the final circumstance of 
purification, but the process of disgorgement itself. 
As a philosophical term, katharsis retained this sense of dis-location. At 
one point in the Rhetoric, for example, terror (phobos), the precondition of 
katharsis, is described as a "species of pain or disturbance arising from an 
impression of impending evil which is painful or destructive in its nature" 
(ii.5.1382 a 21. Emphasis added). Terror, then, and in a different sense, 
katharsis, are neither objective nor subjective phenomena, but are instead the 
manifestation of a fundamental and violent expulsion or disappearance of the 
subject and his pain into an-other locus-either the repressive Other or the 
Real. The intensity of this disappearance produces a loss of identity: the 
collapse of the subject/object into a Third Term, an Unnameable. 
Katharsis then, is an expulsion inaugurated within the field of terror. 
Generated by the terror born of fragmented consciousness, katharsis is what 
it produces-a perpetual unlocatibility, a continuous aphanisis, an infinite 
series of displacements, disgorgements, emeses that serve in the end to 
eradicate all sense of a vulnerable, locatable self. The presumed "healing" 
effect of katharsis comes about because these expurgations and dislocations 
eventually seem to engender terror's Imaginary opposite in the returning 
sense of a sublime following the expulsion of non-being. In terms of 
terrorism, this sublime is perceived as a sense of harmony and stasis in a 
world "restored" by the violence of unanimous law,25 or as the end-of-
repressive-history engendered by the individual violent act. In either case, 
the difficulty in finally locating meaning behind katharsis is the root meaning 
of katharsiS'-and phobos-itself: a word that conceals a lack of significance 
within its inscription. 
The conflation of the medical and political senses of katharsis is clear in 
the Greek drama: "We must use medicine, / or burn, or amputate, with kind 
intention," says Agamemnon in the Oresteia, "take / all means at hand that 
might beat down corruption's pain" (848-50). Katharsis, terror, and pity 
(eleos) intersect in this desire to eradicate a metaphorical dis-ease from the 
polis through the amputation with "kind intention" of the gangrenous 
member. 
The modern dismissal of pity as a noble virtue ("the worthlessness of 
pity," writes Nietzsche, that "pernicious, modern effeminacy") stems in part 
from its dissociation from the blooded brutality of katharsis and terror. 
When Artaud dismisses pity in favor of a cruelty by which the body and 
psyche is scourged and purified~the Plague-he is invoking the older sense of 
pity that sees its violent, reforming aspect. But this reformation can move in 
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two different directions. While Artaud saw in cruelty/pity the possibility of a 
complete reconstruction of consciousness, Nietzsche, and Foucault following 
him, saw in the union of cruelty and pity the means by which pain and 
punishment have been objectified, reified and economized as crucial elements 
in the irruption of a "merciful" and just Law.26 Pity is, in these views, the 
other side of terror, its perversion, the "bright projection of the Sophoclean 
hero" which covers over the dark violence concealed in a "gruesome night." 
Although pity normally evokes the seemingly benign aspect of desire-
pity is empathie, contiguous, the corrective to demand in the sentiment that 
pretends to proclaim "I want what is good for you"~there is much that is 
suspect in pity as it appears in theatre, especially in tragedy, where the 
warpings of desire become so complete that it is often impossible to ascertain 
an object of desire at all. Indeed, one of the most powerful ideas to surface 
again and again in the drama is the recognition that desire does not desire 
any object, but desires only itself. Theatre is what Gilles Deleuze and Feliz 
Guattari would call a desiring machine. 
Desire is the engine that subverts pity, that regenerates the terror within 
it, a painful recognition that the union implied by pity might be a he spoken 
by the Other to cover up an emphatic and absolute alienation or absence of 
being in desire. The desire for what the Other desires (the objectified desire 
of the Other) which is implied by pity is transformed into terror when desire 
cannot capture the Other, or the Other's desire, as object. When desire is 
frustrated in this way, the threat of non-being appears, and either an object is 
substituted for the desire of the Other, or the Other is absolutely denied. 
When a replacement object is substituted for the Enemy-Other, desire 
becomes phobic. When the Other is categorically denied or expelled, a 
"hole" or lack opens in consciousness, and desire/terror is displaced into the 
Real. 
Freud characterized a phobia as a fixation on an object of dread which 
functions as a mask that conceals the space of an other, repressed, desire. 
He gives the example of a young man who wishes to murder his father, but 
cannot admit his desire to himself because it is too fearful. It is so fearful in 
fact that he cannot even admit its existence as an object of fear, and so he 
substitutes another fearful desire in its place, and fears that; he becomes 
phobic and will not go out in public because he is afraid he will murder 
people indiscriminately. This is a particularly provocative example because 
both phobia and the particular example of phobia given are instances of 
dislocation (Freud, Interpretation 293-4). 
The object of a phobia in Freud is not the true terror, but a terror 
dislocated. The Phobic object—the graven shield, the mask, the image of 
terror-both represents and hides the feared and desired Deimos. We might 
seek, then, a repudiated desire in the tragic experience of terror, the 
concealed wish that draws us to the theatre in the first place: perhaps a 
hunger for obliteration and death in the Other suggested in different ways by 
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both Freud and Lacan, or the craving for some primal bloodlust already 
noted by Nietzsche and Foucault, or the longing for a totality in which all 
correspondence and difference is obliterated by a desire "firmly wedded to 
the law in the pure detachment and elevation of the death instinct"—a desire 
for death in an object that will replace the dispersive tedium of history, the 
boredom of hearing the "hypocritical doctors explain what it all means" 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 213). 
At the level of State terrorism, the public performance of the desire for 
death in objectification transforms it into a socio-political ideology: the 
enactment of a tyranny which absolutely denies its dispersion into history and 
language and theatre. Tyranny's resistance to dispersion is enforced by 
terror's embodiment in the words and images of State violence and terrorism. 
In order for tyranny to operate, in other words, its terror must be deployed 
as a sign within the systems of exchange. It must, in fact, become the sign 
system of its own terrorism. Yet paradoxically, the terror that is the result of 
this terrorism-the real pain inflicted on the body-can never become a sign, 
can never enter a system of information and exchange. It remains 
unsignifiable, unrepresentable. This distinction between terror and terrorism, 
the difference between real pain and the techniques of its production, 
represents the reification and commodification of terror into terrorism. 
Terrorism is an extreme, theatricalized violence operating, in Roland 
Barthes' terms, "in the service of the regime of the signifier." But when 
terror's roots and causes are repressed in the formation of 
performance/media/theatre events, and the connections between the 
socializing, disciplining power of terroristic violence are cut-off from the 
ontologie terror which generates them-when terror loses itself in the 
Imaginary-we lose sight of terrorism's mechanisms and are denied the 
possibilities of resistance. Violence then seems to return, individually and 
collectively, in the real in new and abominable hallucinatory forms. This is 
the terror of socio-political madness-that the reality we think we know may 
only be the hallucinated remains of a denied enormity, cast back into the 
world, returned in an other monstrous form in the real. Thus at the level of 
the "political unconscious" the repressed [for most of us] connections between 
the mediated State terrorism of the Vietnam "theatre," and the psychotic 
terror of national non-being that supported it, eventually caused that war to 
re-erupt in American movie theatres in the figure of various sorts of 
reflagged Rambos. Meanwhile, the psychotic footsoldiers of the mediated 
campaign suddenly began to carry Vietnam era automatic weapons into fast-
food restaurants, shopping malls, and playgrounds, falsely proclaiming 
themselves battle-crazed vets before opening fire. All of this while 
performance artists and experimental theatres initiated their explorations into 
the ethos of violence and self-mutilation in ways that sometimes did more to 
confuse the issues of violence and theatre than to clarify their relations. 
Fall 1989 21 
This confusion arises because whenever acts of terrorism of any sort are 
mediated, and through mediation lose sight of the critical, terrorizing 
impulses which gave them birth, violence re-emerges as a mystifying, 
disconnected system of signs whose causes and reasons become permanently 
lost to us. The ultimate danger for us in this is that the fear of national non-
being that led us into the theatre of Vietnam, aggravated by the sense of 
theatricalized irrationality surrounding domestic and foreign anti-state 
terrorist acts, becomes transformed into a kind of proto-fascism, a terror of 
formlessness and fragmentation which is eventually displaced by the law as a 
formal object of fear, fascination, and desire. The law becomes a phobic 
object which hides this terror of non-being, the terror of the Chaos beneath 
the Harmony of Law, the deep and resolute void beyond the imagery of 
violence. This finally echoes Lacan's understanding of phobia, which is quite 
distinct from Freud's: 
Not the fear of an object, but the confrontation of the subject with 
an absence of an object, with a lack of being in which he is stuck or 
caught, in which he loses himself and to which anything is preferable, 
even the forgoing of that most strange and alien of objects: a 
phobia. (Wilden, Lacan 150-51) 
The Lacanian concept of phobia suggests a repudiation, not a 
displacement, the traces of schizo-psychosis and not a "mere" neurotic 
repression. This is tyranny's phobia, a phobia that is perhaps best exposed or 
"deconstructed" in performance, and through performance in culture itself; 
forms of theatre which conceal the filiation between terrorism and ontologie 
terror by substituting a phobic object to cover a "lack of being" must be 
discovered and properly situated so that we can gain an understanding of their 
ideological alignment and the effects of that alignment on memory, on history. 
3, Terror and history 
History, as Nietzsche points out in the Genealogy, is linked spectacularly 
to the creation of a memory in man. This memory is created by inflicting pain 
on the individual, and history becomes the residual pain of the collective scar 
tissue.27 The creation and recreation of this collective memory of pain was, 
moreover, a critical point in humankind's passage from "protohistoric" myth-
religion into history and law. 
Clearly, the collective repetition of the trauma, of that "which never 
ceases to hurt" suggests the necessity of a "being-witness" to the hurt-the 
necessity of an audience in a theatre of pain. History thus appears as theatre 
--an endless re-enactment of the perception of pain, and the pain of 
perception. The present, brief analysis of terror, then, is only a preliminary 
suggestion of history's painful effects displayed as theatre before the subject of 
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culture, effects which are generated out of the split within/without the self that 
is the moment of perception. 
Any exhaustive analysis of terror's threat in performance would, in this 
context, concern itself in part with terror's visible effects on the body as well 
as its demonstrable effects on the mind. But these effects would also operate 
as a "double inscription," emanating at once from the alienation that is thought, 
reinforced and redeployed as perceptible social threat in the political arena 
that we call theatre, and then reformulated and reinjected as alien thought 
once again-these effects would operate, in other words, dialectically. 
And yet I am not, to be sure, suggesting that this process is essentially 
dialectical, only that it has been made to operate as such. Indeed, some 
current theorists see a partial remedy to this pain-production in the abolition 
of dialecticism itself (See for instance the work of Deleuze and Guattari in this 
context), a dialecticism which comes to represent the static world of concept-
ideology which must be subverted by the dynamic world of "becoming." 
Yet this "solution" to theatre's tyranny is finally quite naive, for it is in the 
dizzying whirl of becoming that we first glimpse terror's moment, the moment 
of perception dissolving itself. And in the half-life of terror, seemingly outside 
time and outside history, a mere instant suffices for that terror to find its 
objective case and become an ideologic weapon once again: in other words, 
when the "remedy" of "becoming" is viewed as a remedy, when the becoming 
becomes being, the anti-dialecticism of the "in-between" becomes objectified 
once again as ideology. Attempts to glorify "slippages," or "nomadism," or 
"becomings," or indeterminicies of gender, class, or race still miss the point 
because it is the (Phobic) theatre's function to neutralize and institutionalize 
such anti-categories, and this institutionalization is inevitable as long as thought 
thinks itself, as long, in other words, as there is theatre. 
On the other hand, in the ruptured eye of perception, in the context of 
the "becoming" and disappearance which is also the (Deimic) theatre, the 
history of terror in theater would not be an attempt to see things "as they 
really might have been." Nor would such a history appear as an effort to 
reconstruct the political-economic forces of past periods. Rather, we might 
look at terror's history in a provisional way as the truth of some present, 
historical distress traced by that history on the contemporary body and mind. 
These traces might be recognized by their particular sensitivity to pain, a 
sensitivity which is related in various ways to its methods of production, but a 
pain-terror which is, finally, locatable only in the aphanisis of perception 
disarticulating itself "in the locus of the Other." This is the preoccupation with 
the terror of aphanisis that has been formulated and reformulated throughout 
theatre's history, culuminating in its final foregrounding in contemporary 
performance and theatre. 
And thus the painful irony: while it may be true that the original impulse 
to liberation or knowledge which underlies the contemporary terrorist act or 
violent performance—the impulse that provides the critical connection between 
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terror and its terrorism—is in certain cases courageous and deeply committed, 
those deeply committed impulses are ultimately transformed into a denial of 
the reality of pain. Pain, in other words, loses its impact when, through 
history, it becomes foregrounded-or "repressively desublimated"-in 
contemporary performance. This "repressive desublimation" of pain suppresses 
the real pain of history within the development of an increasingly historicist 
(linear, positivist) postmodernism. This suppression is then sp l ayed in "real" 
acts of violence as performance, but the terroristic nuances of these signs of 
violence finally obscure the coercive, historical necessity of actual violence and 
terror as it is produced within politico-economic systems in the Real, the Real 
that Frederic Jameson says is History.28 
In contemporary performance, this level of mystification assigns the work 
of artists like Chris Burden or Vito Acconci to the tradition of tragic theatre; 
literal violence in performance eventually upholds, as does tragedy, the 
spectacle of the Law in the endless permutations of terror's images, images 
which ultimately, I would argue, always represent the Same Thing-an 
ontological confrontation with the non-being that generates theatre, the terror 
of nothing, Deimos, the missing presence in the shield of Herakles. Any 
particular historical tracing of terror's threat in the theatre would perhaps do 
no better than to observe the places where each play unfolds itself into this 
disappearance, this "original hole," the empty mouth of Phobos. 
Such a tracing, then, would also not be merely qualitative. It would not 
try to legitimize "correct" plays, or condemn others as examples of some sort 
of "false consciousness." On the other hand, it would also refuse to invest itself 
in new historicist studies of the "empirical" conditions of theatrical practice, for 
those "conditions" describe the very scandal against which the anti-empiricism 
of theatricality defines itself-the handkerchief as incontrovertible "ocular 
proof in Othello, for example, or the presumed corporeal presence of an 
absent body that grounds the Western theatre tradition in the Quern Quaeritis 
trope. Such a study would instead try to describe in each case the degree to 
which the connections between terror and its -isms are discernible only through 
the meticulously "perjur'd eyen of theatre itself, and to see how, in each case, 
terror's threat appears both as an ontologie condition of perception, a 
condition of theatre and as the mechanism by which social reformation and 
discipline is concealed and enforced as theatre's double. 
This study could thus never be a primarily empirical or positivist 
undertaking—it could never be a historiography. Indeed, the model for such 
a project might be the ver}7 transformative and perjured vision of lago, or the 
warping eye of Genet through which theatre's lie becomes the limiting 
condition of knowledge, thought, and perception. 
This would be a history of disappearances, a history synchronous and 
coterminous with a history of terror's effects in the theatre, but also a history 
of terror's fading image in the performative traces of its practice.29 In such a 
history we could perhaps note the specific changes in the historical movements 
24 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
of terrorism as it becomes organized, economized, and deployed within and 
through various modes of performance-from the display of the state-
sanctioned terrorisms of the Roman spectacles to the political-aesthetic 
terrorism of Surrealism^-but we would also insist on terror's existence prior 
to articulation, a terror that is, in its reality as disappearance, "passed over in 
silence," to use Wittgenstein's words, only to be appropriated later by the 
various theatres of signs. 
Yet even within these various theatres of signs, no easy distinction can be 
drawn between a terrorism which is deployed referentially in the theatre, and 
one that is deployed in culture as theatricality; as the above examples show, 
the two bleed almost imperceptibly into one another: were the Roman 
spectacles, after all, more theatre or more a "spectacle of the scaffold"? Is 
Breton suggesting a politicization of art, or is he aestheticizing politics? No 
easy answer can be given of course, but what is clear is that there is a 
necessary, a priori appeal to a Nietzschean theatre in each case, an appeal 
which sometimes manifests itself in a terrorism which appears first in the 
theatre, and at other times in a terrorism which formulates itself as 
theatricality in culture, and sometimes, indeterminately as both. 
Finally, in such a historical approach, I would caution against privileging 
pain merely for its spectacular effects. Such an alienation of violence would 
run precisely counter to the ethos of the present essay. Rather, I would 
suggest a theatre history which foregrounds pain because theatre itself does so, 
and because, as Derrida has written in his essay on Freud, "Life is already 
threatened by the origin of the memory which constitutes it"—a memory of 
pain, if we are to believe Nietzsche--"and by the breaching which it resists." 
(Derrida, "Freud" 202) 
The critical issue, then, would not be pain itself, but the often hidden 
systems of pain-production in theatre's history, systems whose hidden 
assumptions and concealed terrors might help us better articulate some of the 
issues raised in the present article: what are the sources of our individual and 
collective traumas, our crimes, the enormities that have been torn from the 
tissue of remembrance in thought and culture? when those memories have 
been repressed or expelled, how have they reappeared as mechanisms of social 
engineering and ideological disciplining? how can we come to learn, especially 
at the political level, what has been dislocated, or excluded? is it possible in 
any proposed investigation to stand somehow outside one's own cultural-
historical warp and reveal these mechanisms of repression and exclusion with 
any kind of clear vision, or does the perversion of seeing that is theatre make 
any such project impossible? should we instead resign ourselves to our 
historical reality as a play of madness, illusion, hallucination, theatre? This is, 
after all, the show that has been playing in the grand theatres of State since 
the beginning, and the beginning was, after all, merely theatre. 
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Notes 
1. The name "Panic," as I will show a bit later, is the name assigned to the sibling terror 
who represents the "outward show of fear." The name also suggest the later association between 
Pan, the god of panic and rout, and his absorption into the image of Dionysus, god of wild-
spaces, god of theatre, god of terror-as-madness. 
2. Although one might take issue with my rather broad use of terrorism-the 
objectification and implementation of terror's threat for ideological ends—I would, for the 
present moment, insist on this definition. One point of the present study is to show how terror 
and its -isms have always been part of the theatrical consciousness and its history, how terrorism 
has always been a product of theatre, how theatre has always been the space of ideological 
coercion framed by reference to real terror. So while some have argued that terrorism is really 
a modern phenomenon (and I would, at one level, agree) there is another sense in which 
modern or Modernist terrorism is but one more manifestation of theatre's terror in history. I 
would, as a result of this disagreement, suggest that we think of terrorisms (plural) as different 
forms of the coercion that has its own, unique modern form. By the same token, I would insist 
on the differences between the various kinds of terrorisms: between right and left wing 
terrorisms, between terrorism from above and terrorism from below, between modernist and 
other kinds of terrorism. If there is a single thread connecting these various terrorisms, it is the 
continuous deployment of the threat of death and pain, a threat which takes different forms in 
different ages. 
3. While I will touch upon these various axes of terrorism, the point of this study is not 
to outline in any explicit way a history of gender, race, or class, simply because I don't want to 
limit the discussion of terror's modes to any one system of coercion. My purpose is, rather, to 
look at theatre as the focus of history's attempts to create any number ideological coercions (of 
which gender may, arguably, be the most powerful), and to look at theatre's terror as a model 
of empiricism which generates the myth of empiricism, an empiricism which is the ground for 
the ideologies of class, race, and gender. It would be contradictory in this sense to provide 
any kind of empirical (i.e. social, economic, scientific) evidence for my arguments when I am 
suggesting that it is theatre itself which generates the bias of empiricism and supports it. 
4. Hartvig Frisch 86. Although Phobos and Deimos also appear earlier in Homer's Iliad, 
their filiation with Ares is not as clearly stated there as it is in Hesiod. Moreover, the form the 
brothers take in Homer is uncertain and variable: at one point Phobos and Deimos are 
described as steeds of Ares, but at another point Phobos is directly referred to as the son of 
Ares. Most interestingly for the present study, in a passage that closely resembles the quote 
below from the Shield ofHerakles, Richmond Lattimore, who has also provided the translations 
of Hesiod given here, describes Phobos and Deimos as inscriptions. Hesiod, on the other hand, 
especially in The Shield ofHerakles, confronts us with an image of the face of Phobos, a mask 
that represents a terror that is separate but essential to the hidden, "unspoken," or disavowed, 
Deimos. The Hesiodic relationship strikes me as more metaphoric, spatial, synchronic, in a 
word, as more theatrical than the relationship described in Homer. 
5. I am using the word "thought" throughout in Artaud's sense. This thought is not 
"thought-image" but is the vital process of perception itself before perception is circumscribed 
in language. 
6. See Liddel and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon for the definition of these terms. Deimos 
is defined as fear or terror, and is ciose in meaning to the Latin timor, fear or dread. Phobos 
is defined as fear, terror or dismay, but is translated in Homer as flight, or "the outward show 
of fear." 
7.1 would like, at least for the moment, to bracket the distinction between metaphor and 
metonymy as they have been developed through Jakobsen and Lacan in relation to psychic 
pathologies: my own use of these terms will differ markedly at times from their current usage 
in psychoanalysis and linguistics, particularly in my own conviction that metaphor represents 
something much more radically indeterminate than metonymy, and my further conviction that 
synecdoche is conceptually aligned with metonymy and not, as some say, with metaphor. See 
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Anthony Wilden's System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange (London: 
Tavistock, 1980). 
8. For a full discussion of this particular relationship between production and desire, see 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, especially section 
four. The final quote is from The Libation Bearers 32. 
9. In a recent book, Nomadology: The War Machine, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari 
point out the uniqueness of metallurgy among the arts, commenting on the reformable, plastic 
qualities of metal as it is shaped, melted, and reshaped into weaponry. I am also reminded of 
that ancient technique of metal casting referred to as "the lost wax technique," in which the wax 
mold is destroyed as the molten metal is poured into it. The traces of the original mold are 
visible only as a negative space in the finished object. 
10. Anthony Wilden, "Lacan and the Discourse of the Other," in Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan 98. Verwerfung in Freud's text, is translated by Wilden simply 
as forclusion, a word which describes the individual's refusal to accept the "Name-of-the-Father," 
or the order of signification and the "law" of language. As a result of this refusal, stimuli which 
are experienced cannot be "placed" and are subsequently cast out into the Real and reappear 
as real and terrifying to the individual who has refused them entry into Symbolic or Imaginary 
thought, but are "not there" to those who might be looking on. They appear to others as 
hallucinations, in other words. 
Although I harbor many reservations about Lacan's work, I have found much that is 
extremely useful, especially when discussing the theatre at a theoretical level. For that reason, 
the reader should be aware of the many specifically Lacanian terms being zmployed-aphanisis, 
the Other, the Imaginary, the Real, the Symbolic and so forth—even though they may sometimes 
not be employed specifically as Lacan intended. I have relied heavily on Anthony Wilden's 
translation and explication of Lacan. Finally, I have applied the ideas of Lacan to the political-
social in ways that have been strongly influenced by Frederic Jameson's The Political 
Unconscious. 
11. Although Marlowe's text serves as a paradigm or metaphor for some of the ideas already 
presented, the text must not, of course, be confused with "reality": the Real in the play, for 
instance, must be read as the Real in relation to the play as it is performed, whatever that may 
be. Needless to say, forclusion is, by nature, unrepresentation. 
12. From Holinshed's Chronicles of England, as quoted in H.B. Charleton and R.D. Waller's 
edition of Christopher Marlowe's Edward II 194n. 
13. See the extremely provocative article by Robin Wagner-Pacific in Journal Spring (1987): 
20-29, entitled "The Text of Transgression: the City of Philadelphia Versus Move," in which she 
suggests that part of the decision to murder the Move community is reflected in the dropping 
of the quotation marks around specific descriptive terms applied to the community, a forclusion 
which transforms a "terrorist" into a terrorist. 
14. Similarly, we might make a distinction between the a/iontologic theatre and ontological 
theatre. Inasmuch as theatre is a space of transformation, it is "anti-ontological"; on the other 
hand, the investigation of theatre's anontology is itself ontological, and thus to avoid confusion 
I will use the term ontology throughout. 
15. An interesting example of this affiliation carried into performance appears in the 
relationship between the characters Verhovenski and Stavrogin in Dusan Jovanovic's production 
of Dostoyevski's The Possessed, performed in 1985/86. 
16. While I would take exception to this last observation—even when the law is benevolent 
and is "doing good" it is violent—I think Wilden makes a valid and valuable point: when we 
discuss the "violence" of language or authority, especially in literary theory, we must speak in 
terms of degrees of violence in the Symbolic order. In terms of the theory and practice of law, 
the question always remains: to what degree is the implementation of law, especially criminal 
law, purely specular, purely Imaginary? The current debates on the inherently theatrical practice 
of capital punishment, for example, throw an interesting light on this question. At any rate, the 
relationship between the theory and practice of law is not unlike the relationship between drama 
and theatre (see below). 
17. Antonin Artaud, in "Fragments of a Diary from Hell": 
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No precise information can ever be given by this soul that is choking; for the torment 
that is killing it, flaying it fibre by fibre is occurring below the level of thought, below 
the level that language can reach. (95) 
18. See Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History 38. 
19. This is in fact the phrase that Lacan uses at one point to describe repression. 
20. Here I should clarify some points: while I find many of Girard's perceptions on the 
mechanisms of violence and representation useful and enlightening, I am in no way citing him 
as a final authority on matters of expulsion and mimesis. I especially disagree with his 
conclusions, in which he seems to see the threat of anarchic violence as a justification for the 
necessity not only of law, but of religion as well. I find this deeply disturbing, especially in light 
of the religious Right's current love-affair with government and law, and its fascination with 
foreign and domestic violence. I should also point out that Girard does not use the term 
"Other" to describe the figure of identification and opposition which he calls a Double, and 
indeed the Double is not the same as the Lacanian Other, however I see a great deal of overlap 
between the two concepts, inasmuch as they both come to represent the locus and mechanism 
of law and social stasis, and they both represent similar generative mechanisms by which desire 
is produced within the individual in society. I hope the reader will forgive this rather terse 
apology for a very complicated relationship. 
21. This is, of course, also Alexander Kojeve's analysis of Hegel's master/slave relation in 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. 
22. I have chosen this particular spelling in order to distinguish between katharsis in the 
theatre, a sense which I will develop at length below, and the more usual and indistinct uses of 
the term catharsis. 
23. G.M A. Grube, in a note in his translation of Aristotle's On Poetry and Style, says this: 
After some hesitation, I have translated phobos by "fear" rather than by "terror." It is 
true that the original Homeric meaning was panic or rout, and that deos is the milder 
word, but by the fourth century phobos was by far the most common word to indicate 
every kind of fear, while our own world "terror" seems to indicate a very violent, rather 
sudden, and often short-lived emotion (12). 
Conversely, I have chosen to follow the Miltonic translation of phobos, which is terror, because 
the precise point I wish to make is that it is terror which generates the Necessity of 
performance, not merely heightened fear. Beyond this, I wish to show terrorism's correlation 
with and development from an Aristotelian/Hesiodic phobos lying somewhere within the 
genealogical strata of performance history. 
24. For example, in a small book entitled Inspiration and Katharsis, the author, Teddy 
Brunius, outlines the last three points of his seven point "solution" of the definition of katharsis 
in these terms: 
5. This study will give a convincing interpretation of where Aristotle's katharsis is to be 
found in the use of a tragedy, and the solution says that if there is a katharsis it is to 
be found in every link of the communication of the tragedy-except in the text. 6. The 
meaning of katharsis will be explained in connection with a source material of Asclepian 
therapeutical practice. 7. According to the linguistic hypotheses of Richards, Sapir, 
Whorf, an exact word-to-word translation of katharsis cannot possibly be made because 
of the change in the cultural situation from Aristotle's time to ours. 
What is interesting here is the way that the author attempts to de-objectify katharsis by 
precluding it from the text itself. 
Gerald Else, another scholar in this arc, had attempted to place katharsis, in true New 
Critical style, "in the text" and nowhere else. However, Brunius sees the difficulty in this, 
because the drama "is a matter of action, of reading aloud, not of a silent text." Thus, he says, 
katharsis is to be located in the audience. Apart from the theoretical difficulties endemic to 
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such concepts as "the audience," this "solution" does nothing to solve the problem: the author 
himself says that Aristotle "did not give any particular location of the particular state of mind" 
called katharsis. Both Else and Brunius seem to insist on identifying katharsis as an emotion, 
or "state of mind," or textual fact, or something that can and must be located somewhere. And 
yet, by the author's own characterization cited above, Aristotle seems to have conceived of 
katharsis not as a thing to be located, but as an essential lack characterized by dislocation. The 
author finally tries to dislocate the problem itself by reference to philology ( what is the origin 
of the term?) and finally, rather lamely, by reference to Sapir-Whorf. See also the chapter on 
katharsis in The Politics of Aristotle, ed. Gregory Vlastos. 
25. This is the sense of the Kantian Sublime, which becomes crucial in the theatre 
theory/praxis in the 19th century. 
26. In addition to Nietzsche's The Genealogy of Morals, see especially Foucault's Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, and Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, by Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari. 
27. "If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never 
ceases to hurt stays in the memory" (Nietzsche, Genealogy 61). 
28. "History is what hurts," says Jameson. Phobos "is a species of pain," says Aristotle in 
The Rhetoric. Completing the syllogism, history becomes terror. 
29. This is, in fact, what I mean by terrorism in the theatre or "theatres of terrorism." I 
would like to distinguish this usage from the more popular idea of terrorism as theatre, which, 
in the age of mediation, it certainly is not. When I speak of terrorism in the theatre, then, I 
mean the specular image of a practice which is really occurring somewhere, which has real 
bodies as the object of its violence, and which represents an actual threat of non-being. 
30. See André Breton, Manifestoes of Surrealism 125. Breton's suggestion (apparently 
inspired by his friend Vaché) that "the simplest Surrealist act consists of dashing into the street, 
pistol in hand, and firing blindly, as fast as you can pull the trigger, into the crowd" was meant 
to awaken the spectator to his own "debasement" and to the exhilarating danger—and beauty 
—of performance menacing art. 
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